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1955] RECENT DECISIONS 1013 
QuAsr-CoNTRACT-MATERIALMAN's LI:EN FOR UNREQUESTED EXPENDITURES 
IN THE PRESERVATION OF ANoTHER's PROPERTY-Plaintiffs were employed to 
make improvements on defendant's building. While the work was in progress 
the roof was partially destroyed by £ire through no fault of plaintiffs. Necessary 
repairs were made without the express consent of the defendant, who was in 
Europe and who had left no one in charge of the building to act for him. The 
trial court entered judgment foreclosing a materialman's lien given by statute 
to "any person who shall, under oral or written contract with the owner of any 
tract or piece of land, perform labor or furnish material for the . . • repair of 
any building . • . thereon."1 On appeal, held, affirmed. Plaintiffs can fore-
close a materialman's lien based upon a quasi-contractual claim for labor and 
materials furnished without request when such labor and materials were neces-
sary for the preservation of the defendant's property. Berry v. Barbour, (Okla. 
1954) 279 P. (2d) 335. 
142 Okla. Stat. (1951) §141. 
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In the absence of additional circumstances, Anglo-American courts have gen-
erally denied recovery to a party making improvements or repairs to the property 
of another without the latter's express or implied in fact consent. "Our whole 
attitude is that we require excuse and insist that it be good."2 The courts have 
advanced a number of arguments supporting their denial of relief: (I) property 
owners should not be forced to receive an unrequested benefit;8 (2) granting 
of recovery would induce intermeddlers to confer benefits indiscriminately; (3) 
persons conferring benefits should be presumed-and this has been made an ir-
rebuttable presumption-:-to intend them as gifts;4 and ( 4) recovery should not be 
based upon some abstract principle of "unjust enrichment."5 In spite of this 
general hesitancy to grant relief, there are decisions permitting quasi-contractual 
recovery where the benefit is bestowed under certain defined and limited circum-
stances. Thus recovery has been given in instances where a special public in-
terest is involved in the maintenance of the property;6 where an emergency 
exists which endangers the property of another;7 where an obligation is placed 
upon a particular class of persons to maintain the property of another, as in the 
case of bailees and finders;8 or where, although there is no legal obligation, the 
person stands in such a relationship to the owner ,that the courts find him the 
party best fitted to preserve the property. 9 While these decisions indicate a 
willingness on the part of some courts to relax the general rule denying relief, 
there is considerable contrary authority in each instance. But even though these 
decisions do not establish exceptions to the general rule which are buttressed by 
a large body of authority, they do reveal that the courts will not always dismiss 
plaintiff's claim by referring to one of the first three reasons enumerated above. 
There is a recognition in these cases that in some circumstances a person con-
ferring an unrequested benefit is neither acting "officiously" nor "gratuitously." 
Therefore, in analyzing the rationale for the general denial of relief, the con-
trolling objection to granting recovery, though often unstated, seems to stem 
from an aversion to laying plaintiff's right to recover on the broad grounds of p~ 
venting "unjust enrichment." The restitutionary problem presented by the prin-
cipal case is one where the courts cannot rely upon the familiar supports of mis-
take, misrepresentation, and duress. Consequently, they must advance their quasi-
contractual remedies into relatively uncharted areas where the only landmark 
2 DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMBNT 141 (1951). 
s Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Ins. Co., 34 Ch. D. 234 at 248 (1887). 
4 WoonwAIID, QUASI CoNTllAcrs §207 (1913). 
5 Holdsworth, "Unjustifiable Enrichment," 55 L.Q. REv. 37 at 51-53 (1939). 
6 Hope, "Officiousness,'' 15 CoBN. L.Q. 25 at 47-49 (1929). See also the treatment 
given by the court in Manhattan Fire-Alarm Co. v. Weber, 22 Misc. 729, 50 N.Y.S. 42 
(1898). 
7Hope, "Officiousness," 15 CoBN. L.Q. 25 at 38-41 (1929). 
s Andrews v. Keith, 168 Mass. 558, 47 N.E. 423 (1897); Kirk v. Smith, 48 Mont. 
489, 138 P. 1088 (1914). 
9 In re Bryant's Estate, 180 Pa. St. 192, 36 A. 738 (1897), permitted an agent to 
recover in quasi-contract for expenditures made immediately after the principal's death in 
order to preserve the property of the estate. See also 30 HARv. L. REv. 402 (1917). 
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for establishing relief is that of "unjust enrichment." It is true that there is 
comparative unanimity among the text-writers that recovery should be per-
mitted in cases such as the present one,10 but there is a dearth of case authority.11 
The reluctance of the courts is undoubtedly based upon a fear that such a 
broad test as "unjust enrichment" will result in the decision in each case being 
reached through the subjective moral determination of the judge and not in 
accordance with predictable or objective rules of law.12 However, the courts 
need not deny recovery in a particular case solely because the general test of 
liability advanced is inadequate, being too broadly or indefinitely stated. There 
is no insuperable obstacle to the establishment of a test which will adequately 
describe the particular circumstances in which recovery is given. 
The fact situation of the principal cases lies within that penumbra which the 
law first casts as it advances its judicial shadow over a field of action formerly 
governed solely by the community's pattern of conduct. It is an area in which 
the distinction between a moral and a legal right is unclear. But it is in such 
an area that it becomes apparent that the "law is also a conscious or proposed 
growth ... [and] the judge is directed to the attainment of the moral end and its 
embodiment in legal forms."13 It is clear that the community would not sanc-
tion the proposition that under all circumstances a person should be compelled 
to reimburse another for a benefit received regardless of any request. In an age 
of increasing interconnections between members of society, the autonomy of 
the individual is still recognized sufficiently to permit that much self-determina-
tion. But it is equally clear that there is an expectation that recovery should 
follow upon the performance of certain unrequested acts. The courts, recogniz-
ing this expectation, are beginning to establish the line between circumstances 
where legal relief will be given and those where it will not. The judicial rules 
defining that line are an attempt to prescribe some guidepost beyond mere "unjust 
enrichment," and the defining process is one of employing "experience developed 
by reason and reason tested by experience."14 As has been pointed out, those 
rules must be drawn from a limited number of decisions which advance beyond 
the general conservative approach to these cases. But they indicate that recovery 
may be allowed, as in the present case, when the owner of property receives 
and retains a material benefit conferred by another who intends to be recom-
pensed and who stands in such a relationship to the property that he may rea-
sonably make expenditures necessary for the preservation of the property before 
lOR.ESTITCJnON REsTATBMBNT §117 (1937); WOODWARD, QUASI CoNTRAC'l"S §197 
(1913); KEENER, TREATISE ON THE LAw OF QuAst·CoNTRAcrs 354 (1893); Thurston, 
"Recent Developments in Restitution: 1940-1947," 45 MICH. L. REv. 935 at 941-944 
(1947). 
11 "The number of situations in which restitution has been permitted is surprisingly 
small." Reporters' Notes, REsTITm'ION REsTATBMBNT §117 (1937). But see Karon v. 
Kellogg, 195 Minn. 134, 261 N.W. 861 (1935), noted in 34 MICH. L. REv. 577 (1936). 
12 Holdsworth, ''Unjustifiable Enrichment," 55 L.Q. REv. 37 (1939). 
13 CAro>ozo, THE NATURE oF THE JUDICIAL PRoCEss 105 (1921). 
HPotJND, JusnCE AccoRDING To LAw 60 (1951). 
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it is possible to communicate with the owner.15 Such a test prescribes certain 
prerequisites to recovery in each case in the form of requirements as to the 
status of the pe15on making the expenditures, the intent with which he makes 
them, the necessity of the repairs to the preservation of the property, and the 
immediacy of the prospective damage as justifying the failure to contact the 
owner. 
In a case such as the instant one, it is not enough that the plaintiffs establish 
such a quasi-contractual right to recovery; they must still establish their ma-
terialman' s lien according to the provisions of the statute. The statute by its 
terms covers only expenditures made under an "oral or written contract."16 
However, the holding of the principal case that the word "contract'' includes 
"quasi-contract" is consistent with analogous cases giving a procedural right 
when the statute by its terms applies only to "contract" cases, e.g., attachment 
and counterclaim statutes and those limiting the types of cases to be heard by 
inferior courts.17 There is considerable authority to the effect that such lien 
statutes should be narrowly construed in application.18 Nevertheless, the court's 
holding is in accord with the broad purposes of the materialmen's lien statutes, 
which are "intended to enforce the equitable principle, that one who knowingly 
takes the benefit of the property or labor of another, in the form of improve-
ments made upon his land, ought to have the land subjected to a lien for the 
value thereof."19 
William R. Jentes 
15REsTITUTioN REsTAT.BMENT §117 (1937); Hope, "Officiousness," 15 CoRN. L.Q. 
25 at 51 (1929). 
16 42 Okla. Stat. (1951) §141. 
1715 MICH, L. REv. 332 (1917). 
18 Pace v. Nat. Bank of Commerce, 190 Okla. 503, 125 P. (2d) 178 (1942); 2 JoNEs, 
1..mNs, 3d ed., §1554 (1914). 
10 Nellis v. Bellinger, 6 Hun (N.Y.) 560 at 561 (1876). 
